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Preflace.

In writing this thesis it

is not the intention of'

the writer to state arty new theories with regard to the
law of Real Property nor has an

down any new propositions of law.

attempt been made to lay

On the contrary an en-

deavor has been made to give but a brief outline of smme
of the prominent changes in thelaw of Real Property.
As a general rule, most of the text books upon the
law of Real Property give the bewildered student but a
faint idea of the law as it
0

exists to-day.

He is re-

quired to plunge blindly into the labyrinth ol' absurd
fictions,

exploded theories and blind superstitions which

form the basis of so imuch of cur law of Real Property.
He is

expected to examine these carefully and to evolve

therefrom a system

of law which he may reconcile with

the almost countless conflicting decisions of the courts
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of numer6us jurisdictions;

and finally,

when he has sat-

isfied himself that he has acquired a conception of what
the law 1n general principles really ought to be,

he is

told by the legislature that his labor has availed him
nught - the law has been changed.

In the following pag-

es no attempt has been Made to state all the charges in
the law of Real Property in Pennsylvania.

To do this

would require a volume of no small proportions.

That

part of the law of Real Property of the state which treats
of titles

and conveyancing has heen entirely omitted,

with the single exception of a brief reference to the ReWhile both of these s~ibjects form an im-

cording Acts.

portant branch of the law of Real Property,
has deemed it

the writer

wise to limit his research to the law of

estates, leaving the subject of "titles" to be investigated at some future day.
That part of the law of Pennsylvania which is

simi-

lar to the old common law of England can find no place in
this thesis
In

-

it

several

is not within the scope intended.
instarnces the similarity of the law of

the State to the commn'on law has been briefly commented
upon,

but in most cases it

has not been mentioned.

Penn-

4

sylvania being one of the firmest adherents to conmmon law
principles has adopted as her own the great body of the
coimron law of' England subject only to such chares as her
institutions may demand.
the legislature has seen fit,

In addition to these chw.ges
from time to time to intro-

di,.ce additional changes eiMer on account of public policy
or for the purpose o!' effecting Justice.

Some of the

more prominernt of these changes I have endeavored to enum-

erate and comment upon in connection with some of the
changes which have been effected by various adjudications
of t-e courts of the state.

While the changes entumer-

ated here do not comprise the whole number, still

it

is

hoped that such as have been mentioned may lead some
other student of Pennsylvania Law to discover additional
changes and study the law of Real Property of his state
with greater facility

and satisfaction.

Previous to the reign of Charles II,

been a slave to the feudal system.

England had

Long suffering and

oppression had accustomed the sturdy, liberty-loving

Anglo-Saxon to the tyranny of his lord.

Though the feu-

dal system had long previously outgrown its age of usefulness it

was not until the statute 12 Car.

ed that any substantial relief

II

was pass-

was obtained and the an-

tiquated and complex system of land tenures which had so
long prevailed reduced to any degree of simplicity.

By

the statute above referred to host of the feudal burdens
were cast off and all

tenures in

general,

except ±rankal-

moign, grand sergeantry and copyhold, were reduced to one
general species of tenure called "free and common socage."

But the leading characteristics of the feudal ten-

ures still remained and hampered to a greater or less ex-
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tent the free alienation of landed property.
Such,

in brief, was the situation in England,

1681 when Charles II

granted,

by letters patent,

vince, of Pennsyluania to William Penn.
charters it

in

the pro-

In the previous

had been stipulated "that the grantees and

their descendants should be considered as subjects born
There was no provision of' this na-

within the realm."

ture in the charter to Penn which provided however "that
acts of Parliament concerning trade, navigation,
customs,

should be duly observed."

And further,

and the
"that

no custom or other contribution should be laid on the inhabitants,

or their estates,

unless by the consent of the

proprietary, or governor and assemblynr by act ci
The'

ment in England."

sovereignty of the coumtry was

reserved to the king and his successors,
isles,

inlets,

Parlia-

but "the lands,

etc. were to be holdei to the said William

Penn, his heirs and assigns, and in free and coimnon socage,

by fealty only,

for a-1

or by knight-service."

cormmenced,

and

&

services,

and not in capite

Soon afterwards a settlement was

form of governmlent prepared by Penln.

One of the first tasks undertaken by Penn u~pon his arr iv-

al in the province in 1681 was to treat with the Indians,
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for the extinguishment of their claims to the possession
of the territory.

it was agreed that no lands should

besold to any person but Penn or his agents and that the
latter should not occupy, nor grant an:y lands, but such
as should be fairly purchased of' the Indians.
fully observed this engagerment,

Penn faith-

and the Indian claim to

all lands within the present limits of the state, has
been extinguished by operation of successive purchases.
Various prohibitory laws with severe penalties annexed
for the violation thereof were passedIto prevent any intrusion or settlement of the unpurchased lands of' the
Indians.

So sacred was this principle esteemed, that it

was held to be a rule of property,
before such title had been

that a grant of lands

extinguished, was void.

(Thompson V. Johnson, 6 Binn. 68(1815).
all the lands in Pennsylvania,

is

Thus, title to

derived from the Indi-

ans,not by acquisition and conquest, the result of a cruel and relentles war of extermination and disposition,
but by a fair,

equitable and just treaty of purchase en-

tered into by the Indians
cion,

voluntarily,

duress or com pulsion of an~y sort,

was to be upon a valuable consideration.

without any coerand every sale

8

What a vast eof.trast between the policy instituted
and carried out by Penn and which was adriered to so scrup-,,
ulously by his successors and subsequently

by the state,

and that pursued by the Governors of' the other col.onies
whose admirAstrations are stained and marred by deeds of
dishonor, broken pledges and injustice to the Indians.
The title
prietary,
in

to the soil being thus vested in the pro-

he had the undisputed right to dispose of it

whatever manner he thought proper.

Availing himself

of this right Penn established a land department,

the

officers and coimmissioners of' which were his agents.

NO

regular system was adhered to in making and confirming
grants to individuals.

The leadinrg object being to sur-

vey off each particular grant,
turned into the land office,
patent.

and have the survey re-

and thereupon to grant a

But as may be supposed, great irregularities

were introduced and as a result, titles to lands became
complicated and for a long time insecure.
islature,

But the leg-

aided by the adjudications of the cnurts,

at

length perfected a systerm which has almost quieted con-

troversies arising out 'of'original titles.

Penn's char-

ter provided "that the laws for regulating afld governing

9

property, within the said province, as well for the descent and enjoyment of lands,

as likewise for the enjoy-

ment and succession of' goods and chattelsv
be azd continue the same,
being,

etc.,

should

as they shall be for the time

by the general courts of the laws of England,

un-

til the said laws shall be altered by the said William
Penn,

his heirs or assigns,

aAd by the freemen of' the-

said province, t eir delegates or deputies, or the greater
part of them."
vol.

I,

p.

17. ).

(Penn's charter sec.

VI,

Colonial Records

By the 17th section he had the right

"to parcel out the lands among purchasers, tobeholdenof
himself and his heirs, by such services, customs and rents,
as to him or them should seem fit,

and not immediately

of the crown."
The revolution having dissolved all political connection wiff.:

the crown of Great Britian,

soon atter

its

close, viz in 1779, by an act of' the legislature (lS.
Laws,

479)

the estates of' the late proprietaries,

Vested absolutely in

the commoiwealth.

were

Thus by a sin-

gle strike the sovereign will of' the people of' the n~ewly
erected state made the soil and lands within its
diction (with certain exceptions)

"sub,]ect

juris-

to such dis-
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posal, alienation, conveyance, division and appropriation
as to this or any future legislature of this commonwealth
shall from time to time setm meet and expedient in pursuance of such law or laws as shall for that purpose here
after be madeaad provided."

The act also confirmed all

previous titles of whatever kind from the proprietaries
etc., while the arrears of purchase money for lands, (except the proprietary tenths) were made payable to the corn.
monwealth; all proprietary quit rents were extinguished,
and the tenure from free-socage became a.llodial, the grantees being vested in their own right with the absolute
title,

mconrnected with any superior, and not subject to

any service.

Various statutes were subsequently passed

for the purpose of regulating the granting of letters
patent to warranties by the state.

The result of these

changes is well and clearly stated by Judge Reed in commenting upon Blackstone's Commentaries

He says, "In

reviewing the preceding chapters in the Commentaries, on
the subject of titles and tenures, and contrasting them
with our free, unencumbered, and absolute estates, one
cannot suppress his astonishment, at the immeasurable difference between them.

Every species of oppressive bur-
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den,

that an unlimited prerogative,

and insatiable cupid-

ity could suggest, and but illy concealed by a long train
of absurd fictions,

is

while the

attached to the one,

other is absolutely free from all restrictions and Incumbrances,

iand the holder is

contemaplated as the lord par-

amount of his own estate." (Pennsylvania Blackstone,
I,

Vol.

p.359 ).

It

has bee

miaintained by some high authorities that
The leading

tenures do not now exist in Pennsylvania.

who expressly

champion of this view was Judge Woodward,
decided in Wallace V. Harmstad,

499,

8 Wr.

that since the

revolution, Pennsylvania titles are allodial, hot feudal.
But the weight of authority seems to be the other way.
Professor Mitchell of the University of Pennsylvania in
referring to this question,

says,

- "it

is

a question on

which high authorities are ranged on either side,
tenures now exist in Pe:nrsylvania.

whether

Tenures certainly

did exist here prior to the revolution,

anid,

it

is

believed

12

no lawyer ever questioned it,

that they still exist."

This view is also supported by

Chief Justice Sharswood,
Blackstone,
sylvaria,

Bk.
it

II

ch.

and the better opinion is

in

a note to his edition of

VI at p.

77.

He says:

"In

Penn-

lhas been decided that the statute Quia Emp-

tores was never in force,

and subin-feudation always law-

ful; and though there are some opinions that tenures fell
with the revolution,
fore,

yet allagree that they existed be-

and the better opinion appears to be that they still

exist.

The principles of' the feudal system,

underlie all

in

the doctrines of' the common law in

truth
regard to

real estate, and wherever that law is recognized recourse
must be had to feudal principles to understand and carry
out the common law."
"The principles of" the feudal system,"

said chief-

justice Tilglman,

"are so interwoven with our jurispru-

dence that there

is no removing them without destroying

the whole texture."

Lyle V.

"Though our property
ice Gibson,
mong us in

is

Richards, 9 S and R.,

333.

allodial," said chiefl-Jus-

"yet f'eudal tenures may be said to exist a-

their consequences

and the qualities which
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they OrIginally imparted to estates;

as for jiistance,

in

precluding every limitation founded on an abeyance of' tlofee."

(ic.Call v.

Nuly,

3 Watts,

view taken by these authorities
ing Act of 27 February,
the propriotariese

In

71.)
is

support of the

the fact that the 1Divestm

jras simply a transfer of

1779,

rights to the commonwealth.

There

is not a single section in this act abolishing any lordship,

etc,

- they were transferred only.

And though the

commonwealth, is not regarded, in tile feudal light, superior lord of the snil,

and though the lands of intivid-e

uals are not held mediately of' the state,
any other service,

yet,

upon fealty or

the government of' the state,

ing one founded by universal

consent,

is

be-

unlimited in

its

powers and authority, except so far, as exceptions are
enumerated

in the constitution;

with this limitation,

the

legislative power embraces all cases affecting the public good,

both as it

regards the co mnity as a whole,

and the individual members compfosing it.

It was one of

the fmdamental principles of property that where no one
individual has an exclusive right to any specific piece
of property it

belongs to the comunity.

Agreeably to

this principle tbelegislatuire of' Pe:nsylvania has enacted
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from time to time various acts the first of which was
passed in 1787, the rreamble of which declared it to be

an act "to declare and regulate escheats."
One species only was provided for.

That is, where

any person at the time of his or her death, "is seized or
possessced of' any real or personal estate, within this commonwealth, and dies intestate, without heirs, or any known
kindred, such estates shall escheat to the commonwealth."
2 S Laws, 425.

Escheats "propter delictum tenentis",

are entirely abolished by the constitution of the United
States, (Art I. Sec. IV. Subs. 3; sec. X, sub. 1; Art.III
sec. III sub. 2) and of the commomwealth (Art. I, sec.1819)

.

It is evident therefore, that in Pennsylvania

"the owner of land still stands in a relation to the state
which corresponds, in some degree, to feudal tenure; for
whenever the title to land fails, through defect of heirs
the land reverts by escheat to the State, which therefore
occupies, so far as the doctrine of reverter is corfcerned
the position of' paramount lord.

15

For the purpose of convenience I shall follow to a
great extent the arrangement of' Blackstone in
Book of the Commentaries.

It

is

to follow the wellbeaten path.

the Second

easier and more natural
And in

accordance with

this arrangement I propose to consider briefly,

first,

Free hold Estates of Inheritance.

Blackstone has defined an estate of' freehold to be
"such an-estate in
in,

lands as is

conveyed by livery of seiz-

or in tenemeiats of any incorporeal nature,

equivalent thereto."

by what is

This definition may be accepted

as fa correct statement of the common law meaning of the
t-errml.
While this definition may proye very satisfactory to
the Pennsylvania lawyer as to the origin &f this estates,
it

gives but an imperfect

idea of the subject as under-

stood in that state, where the right of property always
draws after it the right of' possession.

And when by con-

sent the one id transferred, the law furnishes the 9eans
I
of obtaining the other.
In Pennsylvania lIvery of seisin

16

is unknown, and the term "possession of" the soil by a
freeian" has little if any place in the jurisprudence of
the state except as a relic of antiquity.
Any estate in lands or tenements, however created,
whether of inheritance or for life,

is considered a free-

hold, the ownership and not the possession giving character to the estate.

As we have already observed, the feudal doctrine with
rega d to land tenures in Pennsylvania is entirely exploded, and every owner of land holds it in his own right,
without owing any rent or service to any superior.

He

holds not in his demesne as of' fee, but absolutely in
dominico suo.

RespeCt for precedent and ancient forms,

alone has continued the expression as of' fee'though the
reasons for its former use have no relation to the present
condition of Pennsylvania titles.

But the general char-

acteristics or this estate are very similar to the estate
of fee Bimple at common law.

It is only necessary, there-

fore to poilnt out a few of the distinguishing character-
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istics in order to give an, idea of the estate as it now

exists.
Blackstone says, "The word'heirs'

is necessary in

the grant or donation in order to make a fee or inheritance.

For if land be given to a man forever, or to him

and his assigns for ever, this vests in him but an estate
for life."

lie then proceeds to point out the exceptions

iiereby the rule

"

is now softened."

It has been frequer

ly held that the rule still exists in Permsylvania though
changed by vatious adjudications for the purpose of d~ing
justice and to give effect to the apparent intent of the
parties.

In some of' the later cases there seems to be

a disposition to relax the rule even in executed conveyances inter vivos.
F. Sm.,t228)

Thus, in Freyvogle v. Hughes (6 P.

a conveyance was made to a trustee and his

heirs, for the separate use of$ a married woman, no words
of limitation being used as to her estate, and the Supreme
Court held that the limitation of the legal estate was
t
enough to give her a fee, that being the evidenIt intent
of

the grantor.
1885,

Again, in Ringwalt v. Ringwalt (Leg. Int.

p. 80), a conveyance was made of' real and personal

property to the grantor's mother, during his life, re-
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mainder to his lawful issue if he bad any, and in default
of such issue then to "his surviving brothers or their
legal representatives."

It was held that the surviving
In Mergenthaler's Appeal,

brothers took estates in fee.

fifteen W. N. C. 442, Judge Gorden said, "it may now be
regarded as settled that even tecinlcal words of limitation found in an executed conveyance, may be so qualified by the context as to make them conform to the intentior of the grantor.A further exception to the old colmnon law rule is
found in the case of wills.

Wheneverin . will, on a

fair construction of the whole instrument, it appears to
be the intention of the testator to give an estate in fee
use of
such an estate will pass without theAwords of inheritance
(Fulton v. Moore, I Cas. 474 .

But, in cases prior to

the act of 8 April 1833 (Wills Act) some intention must
be shown which will be equivalent to the technical words.
Section 9 of" the Wills Aet rrovides that all devises of
real estate shall pass the whole estate of' tl

testator

in the premises devised, although there be no words of
inheritance or of perpetuity, unless it appears by a devise over, or by a limitation, or otherwise in the will,

19

that the testator intended to devise a less estate.
This section does not apply to wills executed before the
passage of the act,
(Smith v.

Coyle,

although the testator died afterwards

1 W. N. C. 370).

As at common law,

the

ch&ef incident and attribute of an estate in fee simple
in Pennsylvania, is the power of the owner to alien or
transferitand all general provisions and restrictions
upon alienation are voi4, because they are held to be repugnant to the nature of the estate.(Walker v.
7 Har. 371).
tion,

I

alien is

Vincent,

When speaking of common law in this connee-

rean the later common law since the right to
comparatively recent and is

dal doctrine which at first

contrary to the feu-

forbade and afterwards dis-

couraged alienation 6f lands,

while it

recognized smd per-

mitted subinfeudation.

The distinction between estates tail and fees-simple
in Pennsylvania is unimportant since, by statute,
tates tail

are to be construed into fees-simple.

esThe

question has usually arisen on the distinction between an.
estate tail

and a life

estate with remainder,

fee wit?1 executory devises after it.

or a base

The Supreme Court
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of the state has refused to consider the question as being
of any importance, where the only question was whether
the limitation was a fee-simple or a fee-tail.(Kennedy V.
Humes 15 W. N. C. 508).
Since but few estates tail exist in Pennsylvania at
the present time, and those can readily be converted into
estates in fee-simple, the only pointsof practical impbrtance are how the estate is created and how it may be
barred or changed into an estate in fee-simple.
In regard to the method of creation it is sufficient
to state that estates tail are generally created by convey..
ance or devise to one and the heirs of his body.

But

words of procreation are necessary.(Mclntyre vs. Ramsey,
11 Har., 320).

The word issue has been held to be an

apt word of limitation and to import a fee-tail. (Gast v.
Baer, 62 Pa. St., 35.)

Estates tail had become common

in Pennsylvaia as early as 1705.

In that year the gen-

eral assembly of' the province passed an act for barring
them by simple deed, proved or acknowledged and recorded.

This law was rejected by the Queen in council.

In 1710

anact containing a similar provision met a like fate.
By the act of 27 January 1749

-

500 Purd. Dig., p.720, p1.

1) fihes and common recoveries were made of thle same ef-
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fect in barring estates tail
Of 16 January 1799 (Purd.

The act

as in England.

Dig.

721,

pl. 3) provided that

entails might be barred by deed in the usual form in

fee

simple provided such deed stated an intention -t& bar the
entail,

was further required that after being acknow1-

It

edged according to law such deed should, on motion

in

t

open court,

be entered upon the records of the suprene

court or common pleas as sheriff's
be,

deeds were requilred to

and also to be recorded within six months after its

date in

the recorder's office.

A radical change in the law was made by the-Act of
29 April 1855, which provided: "Whenever hereafter,
any gift conveyance or devise,

an estate

by

in fee-tail

would be created according to the existing laws of" this
State,

it

shall be taken and construed to be an- estate in

fee-simple, and as such shall be inheritable and freely
alienable."

In Nichdlson v.

Bettle 7 P.

F.

Sm. 387,

Judge Strong says,"The act of 1855 practically makes the
statuteD e Donis inoperative.

mon law as it

It

remits us to the com-

w~s before 13th Edward I.

This dec-

laration of capability of transmission by descent and of
alienability is

raere surplusage."

22

The result of this act haR been to prohibit the creation of an estate tailand

the words which would have

amounted to an entail now create an estate in
While estates tail
they were all

are still

to be foumd in Pennsylvania

created previous to April 27,

further provided by the act of 14 April,
al judgment or decree in partition,
shall bar an estate tail

fee-simple.

1855.

It

is

1859 that a fin-

or any judicial sale,

with the same effect as a common

recovery or deed entered and recorded under the act of
1799,

and the purchaser or person to whom the land is

creed shall take an estate in

fee-simple.(Purd.

Dig.

de722

p1.6).

Freehold estates not of Inheritance in

Pennsylvania

are divided as at the common law into two classes:
ventional.

(1)

2,

1, Con...

Those created by operation of law.

The first class does not differ materially from

the estate as it

existed at commnon law.

heriatnce being still
fee-simple,

Words of in-

necessary to con~vey an estate in

in the absex ce or such words the deed or con-

veyance will pass merely a life est~e.

As at co lumon

23

law the estate may be for the life of the grantee or pur
autre vie.

Also as at common law, the tenant for life

must not coLmmit wastewhich

4ay be of two kinds.

untary; and 2,

1.

Permissive.

1, Vol

The tenant for life must

not use the land in such a manner as to cause its value
to dimirlish so that it
purposes for which it

can not be well appropriated to the
was intended when the life t~nant

came into possession.

Thus, in Jones v.

Whitehead the

court restrained the tenant for years from plowing up a
meadow for the purpose of sowing the land with corn(l
Parson's Eq.

Cas.

304.)

In some portionsof Pennsylvania

the old common law rulethat the tenant for life may not
fell timber does not prevail..

It has been held that it

is not waste for tenant to clear wildland of trees when
such land is

thereby enhanced in value.

A tenant for life may mine from an open mine and even make a new opening in order to get at th6 minerals;
but he can not go through ar old opening to reach a new
vein, which is

in effect making a new opening (Westmore-

land Coal Co's. Appeal,

85 Pa.

The act of 10 April,

St. 344).

1848 provided that no tenant or

tenants for life should be restrained from the reasonable
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and necessary use and enjoyment Of the lands arid premises
in his, her or their possession.In Irwin v.
Har.

166,

the court,

the right of

in

Covode, 12

constnuing this act says:

"While

possession contirues unquestioned in

the

tenant, there is no limitation or restraint whatever imposed by our acts of assembly on his working of open
It

mines.

nay

indeed be doubted whether the saving

clauses adverted to, do not empower him to open mines and
quarries that he may have reasonable use &Tid
of the premises,

but this we do not decide,

enjoyment!
for it

is

not

in thecase."
2.

As a general rule,

sylvania is

the tenaht for life

liable for all damages except such. as result

from natural ware and the act of God.
Gloucester,

in Penn-

6 Edward I.,

c.

5 (Rob.

to be in force in Pennsylvania.

The statute of

Dig.
It

9) has b er held

provides:

"And he

which shall be attainted of waste shall lose the thing
whichahe hath wasted,

arid, moreover shall recompense,

thrice as much as the waste shall be taxed at."
Willard v.

Willard 56 Pa.

St.,

119, where there was an

attempt to enforce a forfeiture for waste,
Court refused to allow it.

But in

the Supreme

The remedies for waste now
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in use, are - Injunction in Equity, wrkt of estrepement
under the act of 10 April, 1848, commanding the sheriff
to stop waste, action on the case for damages in the nature
of waste and perhaps the old writ of waste.

The estate of" tenant after possibility of issue
extinct cannnot come practically under consideration under
existlr.g laws of Pennsylvania and therefore will not be
further considered.

The furndamental principles of" the law of curtesy in
Pennsylvania are very sirai'ar to the common law principle
of this estate.

But the cornmon law rule requiring seize-

in has been modified to a great extent.

Thus, where the

wife has th.e right of entry, or constructive seizin, it
has been held that the husband has his curtesy,

in

cases

where there is no actual adverse possession (Stoolfoos v.
Jenkins 8 S. and R. 175).

The intestate Act ct

8 April

1853 sec. 1, Art. IiI provided that the real estate of a
married woman intestate shall descend as th~ereinafter provided, "saving to' the huIsband his right as tenant b

the
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curtesy, which shall take place although there be no issue of tne marriage in allcases where the issue if any,
would have inherited."
Previois to the passage of' the Married Woman's Act
of April 11, 1848, the lands of' married women were liable
to be taken in execution for the debts of the husband,
and his estate by the curtesy initiate sold by the Sheriff in her life time.

But the act of 1848 put a stop to

this injustice and secured to married women the enjoyment
of their estates both as to title and possession.

Va-

rious acts have been subsequently passed fieclaring the
meaning of the act of 1848.
The act cf 1848 gave married women the right t6 make
wills, but the husband may have his right to take her
real estate as tenant by the curtesy if he does not choose
to take uznder such will.

A man who has deserted his

wife or refused to provide for her for one year or upwards is not permitted to claim curtesy (act May 4,1855,
sec. 5).

Common law dower can only exist in Pennsylvania at
the present time in cases where a married man conveys his

27

lands or tenements in his life time and his wife does not
join the deed of conveyance.

This is due to the various

statutes which have been passed from time to time.

Both

dower and' curtesy may be had in an equitable estate (Shoemaker v. Walker 2 S.&R.

And the seizin of' the hus-

555).

band need be but seizin in law.
The act of April 8,

1833 provided that where

n in-

testate shall leave a widow and issue, the former shall
be entitled to one third of his real estate for the term
of her natural life, and to one third of his personal estate absolutely.

If' the intestate shall leave a widow,

and collateral and other kindred, but no issue, the widow
shall be entitled to one half of the real estate,
ing the mansion house and appurtenances)

(includ..

for her life and

to one half of the personal estate absolutely.

In de-

fault of known heirs or kindred who might take under the
act, the real estate vests in the widow for such estate
as her husband had therein, anwd sfe is entitled also to
all the personal property,

absolutely.

was expressly declared to be "in

This provision

lieu and full satisfac-

tion of her dower at coimon law."
The Wills Act,

8 April,

183,

sec.

11 (Purd.

Dig.

p.
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1711) provides: "A devise or bequest by a husband to 1is
Wife of any portion of his estate or property,

shall be

deemed and taken to be in lieu and bar of her dower in
the estate of such testator,

in

like manner as if

it

were

so expressed in the will, unless such testator shall in
his will-declare
in

otherwise.

Provided,

That nothing here

contained shall.deprive the widow of her choice,

eitha-

er of dower or of the estate or property so devised or
I

bequeathned.
The Married Woman's Act of April 1l,

1848, sec. 11,

declared that the section of' the Wills Act above mentioned
should not be construed to deprive thd widow of a testator in case she elects not to take under the will of her
his
share of,,persoral estate, but she was given her choice
either of the provision made for her by the will or of
her share of the personal estate inder thd Ihtestate Laws.
The act of April 20,
tny person has died,

1869 sec. 1,

provided, "In case

or shall hereafter die leaving a wid-

ow and a last will and testament,

and such widow shall

eleot not to take under the will,

in

common law as Leretof'ore,
interest in

lieu of' dower at the

she shall be en title

t to such

the real estate of' her husband as the widows
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Of decedents dying intestate are entitled to under the
existing laws of' this Commonwealth."
Since the passage of' the last mentioned act comnmon
law dower exists in Pennsylvania only in the onre case
previously mentioned.
Dower may be barred in Pennsylvania by,
1.

Wife joining in deed of conveyance with separate acknowledgeldent.

2.

Divorce, "a vinculo matrimonii."

3.

Elopement and adultery of wife.

4.

Devise in lieu of' dower.

5.

Jointure.

6.

Ante nuptial settlement in equity.

7.

Sheriff's sale.

8.

Orphans' Court sale for payment of debts.

In its general characteristics the Pennsylvan&a estate for years does not differ in any material point from
the commaon law estate of tihe same name.
The statute of' 4 Ann, c. 16, sec.

9 which abolished

the old rule requiring th~e tenant to attorn to the vendee
of his landlord is also in force in Pez~sylvania.

Rob-
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ert's

Digest,
In

+45

.+46.

computing the length Of' the term, the old commnon

law rule with regard to the length of a month as laid
down by Blackstorie,

does not prevail

in Pennsylvania where

a month mIeans a calendar and not a lunar month.
ley V.

Garey,

6 S.

and R.

539).

(Shap-

A term for a period

less than three years may be created orally; but if it
exceeds the period of three years a writing is necessary.
Act 21 March,

1772,

sec.l,

(Purd.

Dig.

p.

830 pl.

1

).

The Pennsylvania courts have laid down an exception
to the old coimora law rule that tenant for years is not
entitled to emblements where his estate expires by its
By a custom peculiar to Permsylvania,

own limitation.

wh.ere the term ends in

the spring tie

to return during the sunoger,

tenant is

permitted

after his estate has expired

and take his grain whIch was sown in the previous autumn.
Bittinger v.

Baker,

5 Cas.

66.

The estate from year to year still
sylvania and is

exists in

Penns-

s imilar to th~e com'on law tenancy ±'rom

year to year except that three months notice instead of
six is

wequired in

order to termidate the tenancy.
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The estates of tenants at will,

still

exist in

ap.d at sufferance

Pennsylvania as at colmmon law and do not

differ from the common law estates, except that in the
case of estates at will the landlord must give three month' S
notice to quit to entitle him to the summary process given by statute (Purd.

Dig.

p.

1018 pl.

While the theory of mortgages
very similar to tlat

20,

act of 1863.)

in Pennsylvania is

of the common law,

the methods by

which payment of the debt secured by the mortgage is
forced are very urlike those used in England.

er.-

By a fic-

tion of law the mortgagee has the legal title vested in
him subject to be divested upon the payment of the debt
secured by the mortgage but he has no estate in
lands.

The mortgage in

merely a chattel real.
ch.oose-in-action,

the

the hands ofthe mortgagee is
He has only a debt due him, a

which, on his death,

executor and not to his heir.

But,

descends to his

notwithstanding this

change brought about by equitable principles,

so much of

the common law character of the mortgagee's title

still

remains as to enable him to take possession of the proper-
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ty and to bring ejectment f±or it,
is

made in payment of' the money,

certainly after default
or any part of it,

ing to the stipulations of the mortgoge and,
before default.

Youngman v. R.

R.

accord-

perhaps,

even

Co., 65 Pa. St. 278;

Guthrie v. Kahle, 10 Wr. 333.oMortgages by deposit of
Bowers v.

title deeds do not exist in Pennsylvania.
Oyster,

3 Pa.

St.

233.

All mortgages,

other than pur-

chase money mortgages (which have sixty days),

must be

recorded at once, to secure their lien against other mort_
gages,

conveyances

and judgments.(Act

28 March,1820).

All mortgages must be irl writing, under seal and acknowledged,

and since the act of June 8,

clause,

when separate,

But,

thd defeasance

must also be by deed,

the saie time as the conveyance,
ty days.

1881,

executed at

and recorded within six-

notwithstanding the -,lamn words of the

statute,

that "no mortgage shall be a lien until left

record,"

it

ias been held,

ir

accordance with equitable

principles that an unrecorded mortgage is
the mortgagor,
the mortgage;

and all
and all

for

good against

claiming under him with notice of
volunteers are bound by the mort-

gage, whesther they have notice or not.

No one is

pro-
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tected by the statute but a bona fide purchaser, without

notice.*

Mellon's Appeal, 8 Cas. 121.

The mortgage has

three remedies: (1) To take possessio. of the-,,mortgaged
Premises during the continuance of the debt, or obtain
Possession by ejectment;(2) After the debt has become due
proceed on the bond which usually contains a power of attorney to confess judgment;
the mortgage.

(3) Issue a scire facias on

The latter course is usually taken, and

the land is sold under a writ of levari facias, by sherirf's sale.

Ejectment is seldom resorted to on account

of the length of the p-roceedings, and also because the
mortgagee who has recoyvered possession nmust account for
of the estate
all the rents and profits actually received, and also
those which would or might have been received but for his
negligence.

In regard to uses in Pennsylvania, little need be
said.

I need but state that the most importa-1t provis-

ions of the Statute of Uses or the Statute 27 Henry VIII
c 10 are still in force in Pennsylvania (Robert's Dig.p
412: Ruish v. Lewis, 9 iar. 73) and then leave the subject.
The only important statutory provision enacted in regard

to trusts is
that,

the Act of 22 April,

except implied trusts,

all

1856,

which provided

declarations must be in

writing and signed by the person creating same or else mar

ifested,

in his last will and testament.

What has been said with regard to the law of Uses
and trusts in Pennsylvania applies equally well to the
law of Rnmainders and Reversions.

An examination of the

numerous decisions of the Pennsylvania

courts upon this

important brancI, of the law of real property must lead
one to conclude that the entire law of England with regard to remainders and reversions has been adopted in
Pennsylvania with slight if

any variations;

and such chang-

es as have been made have not effected the principles of
the common law.

The decisions of the courts as a gener-

al rule havea tendency to modify the harsh rules of the
comnuon law where this has been practicable,

and to give

effect to the apparent intention of' the parties when such

modifications do not contravene public policy.
dency is

This ten-

especially noticeable in those cases where it

has been attempted to apply the Rule in Shelly's case.
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The courts have not alwaysadhered to the old settled
r1ale with regard to what are words of purchase and what
Mrds of limitation.

Though numerous and respectable
way,
authorities may be found the otherAthe doctrine in Peruasylvania is, that the rule shLll only take effect, when
it is not controlled by the intention of the testator.
(Lessee of Findlay v. Riddle 3 Bin, 139).

But ordinar-

ily, the word "heirs" seems to imply that the ancestor
shall take an estate ±n fee.
Trusts for accmulations, when contrary to a sound
public policy have always been discouraged and discountenanced by the Pennsylvania courts; and by the act of
14 April, 1853, sec. 9, it was expressly provided that
no person shall settle and dispose of any property so
that the income of the same shall be accumulated for any
longer time than the life or lives of such grantor or
testator, and the term of twenty-one years thereafter.

Knowledge of the old common law with regard to
tenancy is

titles

chiefly valuable in Pennsylvania in

which go back of 1812.

was passed which,

joint

examining

In that year a statute

under the decisions of the courts of
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the state, has turned all such estates into tenancies in
common.

It provides: "If partition be not made between

joint tenants, whether they be such as might have been
Compelled to make partition or not or whatever kind the

estate or thing holden or possessed be, the parts of those
who die first shall not accrue tp the su±'vivors but dhall
descend or pass by devise, and shall be subject to debts,
char.ges, curtesy or dower, or transmissible to executors
or administrators and be considered to every other intent and purpose in the same manner as if such deceased
joint tenants had heen tenants in common: Provided always
That nothing in this act shall be taken to affect any
trust estate."(Purd. Dig. 939, p1. 1).
While, in effect, this statute deprives joint estates
of all the peculiar features which distinguish them from
tenancies in common, it does not prohibit testators or
grantors from expressly creating a right of survivorship.
(Arnold v. Jack, 12 Har. 57).

But express words are re-

quhted to create such an estate. (Kerr v. Verner. 16 P.

F. Smn. 326)
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Notwithstanding the Married Women's Act of 1848 it
has been decided that estates by the entireties still
exist in Pensylvania,

the c-'urt having determined that

the effect of' that act was a protection to her in her
seizin of the whole land, so that she could not be depriv.
ed of it by a sale of her husband's interest therein in
his lifetime. (McCurdy v. Caming 64 Pa. St. 39).

Nor

does the act of 1812 which abolished survivorship among
joint tenants apply to this estate.
Diver v. Diver 56 Pa. St. 106 where it

This was decided in
was determined that

the estate held by husband and wife is not a joint tenancy and thereford not within the tetras of that act.
By the third section of the Intostate Act of 1833,
previously referredto, it is Iwovided that the real estate. of an intestate shall, in certain contirigencies,
therein enumerated, "vest in the father and mother of
such intestate during their joint lives and the life of
the survivor of them."

It would seem that in such cases

the father and mother, if both living, take as tenants
by the ent iret ies.
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Estates in Coparcenary

can exist in

Pennsylvania only

in those cases to which the statute regulating the descent and distribution of Intestate Estates, does not apa...t
ply, since that expressly provides that, where lands descend to several pemons under its provisions,pthey shall
take and hold as tenants in common.
nary can exist only in

Therefore coparce-

cases of' estate tail

and trust es-

tates.

Tenancies in

common,

in Pennsylvania,

are so very

similar to the same estate at coimmon law as not to require any further sonsideration here.

The acts which

have been passed applying to this estate are few and have
to do with the law of procedure rather than substantive

law.
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n.In the preceding pages I have attempted to outline
briefly the leading changes

it. the law of Real Property

in Pennsylvania with reference to the Yarious
now In

estates

existence and to define to some extent the nature

of such cheanges and the characteristics which distinguish
the modern law of Real Property in that state from thd laf
as it existed at con umon law.
I propose now to discus briefly a few minor subjects
having reference to no estate in particular.
And first,

with regard to fixtures.

trine that whatever is

The old doc-

fastened to the soil belongs there-

to has been exploded as a test or criterion by which a
case is

to be decided.

Perhaps the leading Pennsylvar.ia

case Upon the subject of fixtures is Meigs' Appeal, 12
P.

F.

Sm.

, 28,

where a question was raised as to the

character of certain frame buildings which the United
States government had erected upon York Conmon as barracks
for troops during the Civil War.
and formed part of the land,
of York which owned the land.

If

they were realty,

they belonged to the borough
If

personalty,

longed to the United St ates Government or its

and they had the right to remove them.

It

they bevendels,

was argued on
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behalf of the borough of York, that tile buildings were
erected upon posts which were sunk deeply into the ground
and therefore,

being fastened directly to the soil and

not merely placed and rested upon it,
the land.

they were part of

But Judge Agnew, delivering the opinion of

the Court,

said,

"The old notion of a physical attacmlent

has long since been exploded in this State. * + ++

The

question of' fixtures or not depends upon the nature and
character of the act by which the structure is put in
place,

the policy of' the law connected with its

purpose,

and the intentions of those concerned in the act."

The law with respect to party walls has been effected to some extent by two statutes.
in

1721,

The first passed

gave to the owner of land the right to enter up-

on his neighbor's groumd and to build his wall equally
upon his own land and that of his neighbor, an ....
provided
that before the neighbor should Use the

)Crty wall so

built, he should pay the first builder for so much of t1a
wa~l as he intended to n~ke use of.
April 10,

1849 (Purd.

Dig.

The other act passed

1307) provided that the right

to the party wall, orto compensation for it,

should pass
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to the purchaser on a conveyance of the house,
wise expressed in the deed,

unless other-

thus making the party wall a

part of the realty and an appurtenance to the land on
r
which the house frist built is erected.(Knight v. Bebnken,
6 Cas. 372.)

The rule laid down by thecourts of most of the

-states

that the title to land bounded by large navigable streams
of water extends omly to high-water mark differs somewhat
from the Pennsylvania rule which extends the title
riparian owner to low-water mark,

subject to the right

of the public to pass over so much of it
low and high water mark,
v.

of the

as lies between

when covered with water.(Pursell

Stover, 14 Out. 43).

The English doctrine that the navigability of a stream
depends upon the ebb and flow of the tide has. never been
intm duced into Pennsylvania where many rivers are navigable far above tide-water.(Carson v.

Blazer 2 Binn. 476).

But few decisions have been rendered in Penn~sylvania
bearing upon the subject of "commor",

and the few cases

which have found their way to the Supreme Court have been
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decided in

accordarce with commuon law principles.

The law of easements in Pennsylvania is
wherever recognized,

to the common law.

similar,

The common law

of England with reference to public Ways or Highways,
Private Ways,

Ways of Necessity,

water rights,

Lateral support,

lots and Pews is

Water-courses and other

Drain and drtp,

Hurial

equally applicableto Pensylvania.

But

the conmion law rule with regard to the easement of "light
andair" has never been acknowledged in Pennsylvania.
The right to air and light may exist,
of an express grant.(Haverstick

v.

but only by virtue

Sipe,

9 Cas.

371.)

While the Recording Acts of Pennsylvania can not
properly be considered a part of t.1e

substantive law of

Real Property within the scope of this thesis,

yet a thor-

ough knowledge of them is absolutely necessary in order
to arrive at a full and accurate understanding of the general law.

The first

ia which received the
of 28 May,

recording act passed in

Pennsylvan-

assent of the crown was te Act

1715 which is

still

in

force.

Another act

amending the act of' 1715 was passed March 18,

1775.

The

substance of both thlese acts is

incorpotated

of 19 May,

109) which provides that

1893(Laws of 1893 p.

in t he Act
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all deeds not acknowledged and recorded within ninety
days"shall be adjudged fraudulent and void as to arq subSequent purchaser for a valid consideration, or mortgagee
or creditor of the grantor or bargainor therein."

